> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.ante.org/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.ante.org/security-and-trust.md).

# Security & Trust

Trust assumptions, subprocessors and recommendations for each risk.

## Security

For any security-related questions, feel free to contact us at <security@ante.org>.

### Audits <a href="#audits" id="audits"></a>

A vault is built from audited [Safe](https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account/tree/main/docs) contracts and [Zodiac](https://github.com/gnosisguild/zodiac) modules, plus one contract Ante wrote. Each contract's auditor and date, in short ([Audits & Security Reviews](https://docs.ante.org/audits-and-security-reviews.md) has the scope and reports):

* **Safe** and **Safe Proxy Factory**: Ackee Blockchain, March 2023 (Safe 1.4.0; Ante runs 1.4.1).
* **Zodiac Module Proxy Factory**: G0 Group, September 2021, on an earlier version of the deployed 1.2.0.
* **Delay**: G0 Group, September 2021. The June 2026 fix was reviewed by Côme du Crest, for Gnosis, in June 2026, on Delay 1.1.1, the mastercopy Ante uses.
* **Roles**: G0 Group and Omniscia, April to November 2023. The June 2026 fix was reviewed by Côme du Crest, for Gnosis, in June 2026, on Roles 2.1.1, the mastercopy Ante uses.
* **Scope Guard**: G0 Group, September 2021.
* **Dead Man's Switch (DMS.sol)**, written by Ante: not audited.

The dead man's switch ([DMS.sol](https://docs.ante.org/technical-stuff/dms.sol.md)) is about 70 lines, holds no funds and makes no external calls.

### Infrastructure security <a href="#infrastructure-security" id="infrastructure-security"></a>

We depend on the following subprocessors, roughly organized from most critical to least.

* [AWS](https://aws.amazon.com/):

  Our infrastructure is primarily hosted on AWS, with servers located in the US, and backup servers distributed in Europe and Asia.
* [Google Cloud Platform (GCP)](https://cloud.google.com/):

  Some secondary infrastructure is hosted on Google Cloud Platform (GCP). All of our GCP servers are in the US.
* [MongoDB](https://mongodb.com/):

  We use MongoDB for some of our analytics data.
* [Netlify](https://www.netlify.com/)\
  We use Netlify to host the Ante web app.
* [Privy](https://www.privy.io/)\
  We use Privy to sign you in and to secure the wallet built into Ante. Privy stores your email address.
* [GitHub](https://github.com/)\
  We use GitHub to store our code and to run our automated tests and deploys.
* [Alchemy](https://www.alchemy.com/)\
  We use Alchemy to read data from and send transactions to Ethereum and to look up token prices. Alchemy sees wallet and vault addresses, which are already public on the blockchain.
* [Pimlico](https://www.pimlico.io/)\
  We use Pimlico to send transactions from your Ante smart account to the blockchain.
* [Amplitude](https://amplitude.com/):

  We use Amplitude to understand how the app is used. It receives product events, such as sign-ins, page views and steps in creating or funding a vault, with the page address, the app version and the vault or wallet address involved, which is already public on the blockchain. Events are linked to your Privy user ID. Amplitude does not receive your email address or your keys.
* [Segment](https://www.twilio.com/en-us/segment)\
  We use Segment to collect analytics events from the app and pass them on to Amplitude.
* [Slack](https://slack.com/):

  We use Slack as our internal communication tool. We may send snippets of data from our users in our internal chats for debugging.
* [Google Workspace](https://workspace.google.com/):

  We use Google Workspace to collaborate. We may send snippets data from our users in our internal emails for debugging.
* [Linear](https://linear.app/):\
  We use Linear to track issues and collaborate.
* [Rollbar](https://rollbar.com/)\
  We use Rollbar to track errors in the app and on our servers. Error reports include technical details, such as the page you were on and the steps that led to the error.
* [Devin (Cognition)](https://devin.ai/)\
  We use Devin to help write and fix our code. Devin can read our code, and it receives our error reports and alerts about the health of our systems.
* [Anthropic (Claude)](https://claude.com/)\
  We use Claude to help write and review our code. Claude can read our code.

### Vulnerability disclosures <a href="#vulnerability-disclosures" id="vulnerability-disclosures"></a>

If you believe you have found a vulnerability in Ante, please submit the report to <security@ante.org>

We commit to acknowledging vulnerability reports within 10 business days, and addressing them as soon as we are able to.

## Trust Assumptions

#### Ante

Ante Vaults is a software interface that enables onchain crypto inheritance and asset recovery without centralized custody. Ante never holds, stores, generates, or has access to a user's private keys, key shares, or assets at any point. Ante does not have control over any user accounts (wallets or Safes) and has no ability to steal or recover funds from user wallets or Safes.

If the Ante app goes down, users can still access and withdraw funds from their vaults in [Safe{Wallet}](https://app.safe.global) or any other Safe-compatible interface. We recommend saving your vault's Recovery Kit (on your vault, the gear, then **Open Recovery Kit**) and exporting your key. [Recovery Kit](https://docs.ante.org/recovery-kit.md) has the steps.

#### Owner key <a href="#owner-key" id="owner-key"></a>

By default one key owns your vault: the wallet you use in Ante. An owner withdrawal has no delay. Whoever controls that key can move the vault's assets at once; the grace period only applies to handoffs.

Recommendation: require more than one key. Ante recommends 2 of 3: a lost key can't lock you out, and one key alone can't move funds.

* Add up to two more keys you own, such as hardware wallets, for three keys in all. On your vault, choose **Show members**, then add a key in the Keys section: connect the wallet, or paste its address.
* Choose how many of the keys must sign, for example 2 of 3.
* Every vault transaction then needs that many signatures, check-ins included. Every key signs in Ante: the key you sign in to Ante with when you start the transaction, and each other key on any device you sign in on, by connecting the wallet that holds it. Then you execute the transaction.
* Your vault runs its transactions in order, so one still waiting for signatures holds up the next, a check-in included. Recommendation: sign or cancel a pending transaction soon, and check in well before your deadline.
* A pending transaction started in [Safe{Wallet}](https://app.safe.global) doesn't show in Ante and is finished in Safe{Wallet}. It can take the same turn as one waiting in Ante: once either is executed, the other can't run.

Signing in to Ante with a wallet is only for existing wallet accounts and ends on December 31, 2026.

#### Privy

We use [Privy](https://docs.privy.io/) to generate wallets for people using email or Google as authentication methods. Privy protects wallet key material using a security architecture involving cryptographic key shares and a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).

This provides important security protections, but it also introduces a trust assumption: the security of a wallet that relies solely on Privy depends in part on Privy's infrastructure and security controls.

A sufficiently severe compromise of Privy's infrastructure could potentially allow an attacker to authorize transactions using a Privy-managed wallet. The exact impact would depend on the nature and scope of the compromise.

**For stronger security, we recommend 2 of 3 keys** (see [Owner key](https://docs.ante.org/security-and-trust.md#owner-key)). Keep the other two keys under your independent control and securely back them up. Compromising Privy alone is then not enough to move your funds.

If Privy becomes unavailable, you may lose access to your wallet. We recommend saving your vault's Recovery Kit and exporting your Privy wallet's private key (**Account → Export wallet**) while the service is still available. See [Recovery Kit](https://docs.ante.org/recovery-kit.md).

#### Module exploits <a href="#module-exploits" id="module-exploits"></a>

A vault relies on Zodiac's Delay and Roles modules, which many other projects also use. A bug in them can let an attacker queue a transaction on the Delay. That happened in June 2026 ([incident report](https://docs.ante.org/june-2026-zodiac-delay-roles-module-exploit-incident-report.md)).

The Delay still holds every queued transaction for the grace period, so a queued attack can't run straight away. In June the grace period gave owners three months to disable the vulnerable modules. No user funds were lost; the only loss was about $24, in Ante team test accounts.

Ante watches every vault's Delay queue. If anything other than a guardian-started handoff is queued, Ante emails the owner and the guardians.

Exploits in shared modules are usually found and disclosed by the modules' maintainers or by another team that uses them; Gnosis disclosed the June exploit on June 1, 2026. Ante then contacted every user with a saved contact method (email or Telegram) and marked affected vaults as vulnerable in the app, with the steps to fix them.

Ante holds no key over your vault and can't act for you. If no owner acts before the grace period ends, a queued attack can run.

Recommendation: keep a contact method saved in Ante. If the app marks a vault as vulnerable, follow the steps on its page before the grace period ends. If Ante emails you about a transaction you don't recognize, contact <security@ante.org> before the grace period ends.

#### Guardians & Recipients

1. Guardians and Recipient could collude to prevent the owner from checking in order to withdraw funds from a vault
   1. Recommendation: don't tell your Guardians/Recipient who other Guardians/Recipient are.
2. A malicious or inactive Guardian(s) could delay asset handoff indefinitely by never approving the handoff after the Dead Man's Switch fails.
   1. Recommendation: Ask your Guardians to check in periodically so you know they are able to carry out the handoff, and rotate out Guardians if you don't trust them to approve handoff. Assign more than one Guardian so that a single inactive/malicious Guardian can't delay handoff indefinitely (e.g., 2 of 3 or 3 of 5)
3. If a vault has multiple owners, each owner implicitly trusts all the other owners of the vaults
   1. Recommendation: only co-own vaults with people you trust to have full control over the vault
4. If you set the wrong address as a Recipient, you could end up handing off assets to the wrong person
   1. Recommendation: Verify with your chosen Recipient that they have control of the email or wallet you specify and update if necessary.
5. If you don't set allowances for the assets (ETH or ERC-20 tokens) you want to transfer to your Recipient, they won't be handed off. ETH hands off as ETH; it doesn't need to be wrapped.
   1. The Ante app will let you know if you have allowances missing, but we recommend double checking as well in the Recipient settings.
6. Guardians who all sign in the same way, for example all by email through Privy, aren't fully independent: one provider problem affects them all.

#### Others

1. Email provider — email accounts are only as safe as you keep your email account
   1. Recommendation: [Set up two-factor authentication](https://frameworks.securityalliance.org/community-management/google#configure-2fa) (2FA) on your email account, ideally using a hardware security key or authenticator app (avoid and disable SMS 2FA)
2. External interfaces — e.g. if you use the Safe{Wallet} interface or Etherscan to interact with Ante Vaults, you trust the source of the interface being loaded. The same holds for the Ante website: if it were compromised, it could ask your wallet to sign any vault transaction, including a withdrawal to another address.
   1. Recommendation: require 2 of 3 keys (see [Owner key](https://docs.ante.org/security-and-trust.md#owner-key)). Each transaction then also needs another key's approval, given in that key's own wallet, so a compromised website can't move funds on its own.
